THE STARDUST INQUESTS in the Dublin Coroner’s Court have heard from its first witnesses today as the process progresses from pen portraits of victims to testimony from families, management, fire personnel and gardaí.

Today, this included details of the fitting of emergency exists and maintenance of fire extinguishers, including how one was empty on the night of the fire and had been empty every time it was inspected in the three years before the blaze.

More than 300 people are expected to give evidence to the inquests into the deaths of 48 people at the north Dublin nightclub in 1981.

The court heard written testimony from two men who are now deceased, who were involved with planning and regulations compliance.

Today’s sitting of the inquest began with a reading of testimony from Dermot King, the senior building surveyor at the Dublin Corporation planning department in the mid-1970s.

Planning application

King, who has since passed away and whose statement was made during a previous tribunal into the Stardust fire, described receiving an application for planning in February 1976 for permission to convert part of a factory building in Artane into what would become the Stardust Nightclub, an adjoining pub and a restaurant.

“On 15 March 1976, a letter was sent to Mr. WC White architect, indicating that the plans were inadequate for consideration under the building bylaws,” the statement read.

After several changes to the submitted plans, King gave permission for the construction of the Stardust in January 1977 and visited the site “three or four times” during construction.

Last month, the inquests heard that steel plates had been welded over the toilet windows of the Stardust club six weeks before the blaze for security reasons. King’s statement read:

I have no knowledge of when steel plates and bars were fitted to the toilet windows.

He was asked by a barrister during the previous tribunal about an inspection of the Stardust on January 15, 1981, in which it was noted that an exit passageway at the side of the stage was obstructed and there was overcrowding in the cabaret room. Mr King confirmed that this constituted “a very serious infringement of the bylaws”.

A reply to these concerns was sent to the planning department by Stardust management represented by Eamon Butterly, who said the back exit had been cleared. Mr Butterly said that tickets had been forged for the show on that night in January, which accounted for the number of people present.

Mr King went on to say that he had no idea that exit doors were being kept locked for up to two hours during performances at the Stardust.

The inquests then heard written testimony from William White, an architect who had sent plans for Stardust to the Dublin Corporation. As White is deceased, his testimony was read to the inquest.

Henry Armstrong, a fire security contractor who had inspected the Stardust, then took to the stand.

Armstrong worked for Chubb Fire & Security Ireland and serviced fire extinguishers in the venue in October 1980.

He found that three of the eight water extinguishers were empty and he refilled them.

Armstrong also found that three out of six CO2 extinguishers were empty and he brought them for refilling.

Speaking of fire safety standards at the time, Mr Armstrong said:

We had no fire safety standards in Ireland at the time of the Stardust fire, so it was based on the British standards, but now we have the best standard in all of Europe.

He said that at the time of the Stardust fire, some of the extinguishers were five feet off the floor, but this is not the standard anymore.

Brenda Cambell KC, acting on behalf of the families of nine of the deceased, asked Mr Armstrong who had decided where the extinguishers were to be located. He replied that a previous sales rep with his company would have told the management the best location to put them.

Mr Armstrong said that on the night of the fire, four extinguishers were used and one failed to operate because it was completely empty. He said that he checked back over the records for the three years before that, and that extinguisher was empty every time he went there:

It was in the hall outside the kitchen. The chef would use it if there was a small flash fire and put it back on the wall. Each time I went there, that one was empty.

Ms Campbell said that one of the features of the club was if numbers were not great on a given night, sections could be partitioned by blinds that were drawn down.

“Four of the fire extinguishers become invisible when the curtain is down,” she said. “Did anyone ever discuss with you when servicing that on a night four of them might be invisible and inaccessible?”

“No, it was never said to me. If it was said to me, I would have suggested they move them forward,” replied Mr Armstrong.

Mr Armstrong went on to confirm that at that time, it was the responsibility of the people who owned and ran the premises to train staff in the use of fire safety equipment.

Dripping ceiling

Evidence was also given by Fiacre Mulholland, who was a sales rep with Cape Insulation Limited at the time. He said that polystyrene insulation was most likely the cause of the ceiling dripping during the fire.

He confirmed that when ignited, polystyrene can melt and fall. He also said that it has a low flash point and burns quickly. Mr Mulholland went on to say that such insulation would not be used today above a nightclub.

And evidence was also heard from Tom Malone, a director of the joinery company who supplied the external fire escape doors and frames for the Stardust. He said that the doors were on cranked hinges to obtain a clear opening to 180 degrees as required by the fire regulations. The doors were designed to open outwards only.

Mr Malone told Michael O’Higgins SC, representing a number of the families, that he made the doors but did not fit them. He said there were no keyed locks on these doors due to fire regulations.

Mr O’Higgins said that the doors were examined after the fire and two were found to have been impeded. He said the right-hand door of one exit could not open because there was a store outside.

“It had to be poorly fitted then, we didn’t fit the doors,” said Mr Malone, going on to say that he was not aware of the store.

He went on to confirm that the door was unable to be opened flush to the wall in the event of an emergency.

With additional reporting by Ryan Dunne/IINA