GERRY ADAMS ACKNOWLEDGED in June 2001 that Sinn Féin needed to move away from “any association of violence” to stop attracting “head bangers” to the party, newly released documents show.
At the time, efforts were ongoing to get the IRA and other groups to decommission their weapons.
Earlier that month Sinn Féin won four seats in the general election in Northern Ireland, making it the largest nationalist party in the region.
According to newly released records, Adams “took issue” with the assertion that, on foot of the election results, Sinn Féin had a greater responsibility to get the IRA to decommission its arsenal.
However, he reportedly agreed that his party needed to distance itself from links to violence.
State Papers – official documents from Government departments and the President’s Office – are generally declassified and released to the public 30 years after the fact. However, some records are released before or after that timeframe for various reasons.
The UK changed its law in 2010 to provide public access to the archival records of government after 20 years. Due to the close shared history of Ireland and the UK, the decision was made to release Irish documents about Anglo-Irish relations and the peace process in Northern Ireland that are over 20 years old.
During a meeting at the Irish Embassy in Washington in June 2001, Adams met with Seán Ó hUiginn, who was then the Irish Ambassador to the United States. Rita O’Hare, Sinn Féin’s main representative in the US at the time, and Richard McAuley, the party’s then-press officer, were also at the meeting.
Sinn Féin won four seats (up from two) in the general election in Northern Ireland, making it the largest nationalist party.
The Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) retained its three seats, while the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) won six seats (down four), and the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) won five seats (up three).
In a briefing document written by Ó hUiginn after his meeting with Adams, he recalled that Adams “took issue with the thesis that Sinn Féin successes in the election created a new responsibility or opportunity for a move on arms”.
Ó hUiginn continued: “[Adams] would have been aware that we had prompted such comment by the ethnic media and some of our friends in Congress.
“I said that was our view and it was an inevitable reality that as Sinn Féin moved into the role of the largest nationalist party in Northern Ireland it would be held to more exacting standards than when it was a relatively insignificant political force.
People expected the party to exert itself to keep the show on the road.
He noted that, “barring a significant move on the arms issue”, he believed David Trimble would resign as leader of the UUP.
‘Angry and polarising elections’
Ó hUiginn said that violence in the Ardoyne area of north Belfast – notably including loyalist protests outside Holy Cross, a Catholic primary school for girls – “reminded us all of the dangers of the marching season”.
Trimble was the inaugural First Minister of Northern Ireland, a role he occupied from 1998 to 2002.
In June 2001 Ó hUiginn noted that if Trimble did resign at the time, failure to elect a new First Minister could result in fresh elections that would likely be “angry and polarising”.
The Ambassador said Adams was critical of “Trimble’s exasperating failures to sell the [Good Friday] Agreement, to engage in any meaningful dialogue about how difficulties could be resolved, and to resort to solo runs and ultimatums”.
According to the file, Adams told Ó hUiginn that Sinn Féin was “totally against” the Assembly being suspended and agreed another election “could be very polarising”.
During the meeting Adams reportedly said: “Trimble’s resignation would be daft.”
Trimble did indeed resign less than two weeks later, on 1 July, over the IRA’s failure to decommission its arms – but he was reelected on 5 November 2001.
He continued to serve as First Minister until October 2002, when the Assembly was suspended by the British Government.
The initial deadline for the IRA to disarm was May 2000, two years after the Good Friday Agreement was signed. This deadline was extended to June 2001, but again was missed.
‘Head bangers’
Ó hUiginn said he told Adams that, despite the missed deadlines, some congressional figures in the US “had taken comfort from his remark that clever minds existed in the Republican movement to find a way out of difficulties”.
“He did not permit himself to be drawn on this but reiterated the goal of seeing the IRA into ‘peaceful retirement’,” Ó hUiginn wrote.
He accepted the need to move Sinn Féin away from any association of violence, not least because they wanted to attract young people with a constructive social agenda and not “head bangers” attracted to violence.
“Timing was however crucial to what he wanted to do.”
Ó hUiginn said he told Adams that “timing was critical for other parties as well, and their requirements needed some consideration”.
“It could prove difficult for anyone to play their cards if the whole card table tipped over. I argued that maintaining the institutions was also important in giving the DUP space to come more fully within the operation of the Agreement.
“Mr Adams agreed on the importance of and potential for change in the DUP. If, however, the Unionists did not prove available as partners, the British in particular had a duty to make up for the difficulties this fact created for the overall peace enterprise.”
Ó hUiginn wrote that, during their conversation, Adams also objected to Sinn Féin “being lumped with the DUP as the two extreme parties [in Northern Ireland], pointing out that 75% of the electorate had backed the Good Friday Agreement – which should be a key consideration for the British”.
Run-in with Ted Kennedy
Adams was also apparently “pleased that his meetings on Capitol Hill had not proved confrontational”. Ó hUiginn added that with the exception of Senator Ted Kennedy, Adams “was not pressed in any aggressive way on the need to move on arms”.
In a note added to the end of the briefing document, Ó hUiginn wrote that Kennedy rang him to say that he had met Adams and O’Hare for about 25 minutes to discuss the situation in Northern Ireland.
“Senator Kennedy praised the Sinn Féin performance in the elections and of Mr Adams’ own historic achievements.
“He pointed out however that these achievements carried the responsibility of ensuring that Sinn Féin politics were freed from any shadow of violence and urged strongly that the time for a significant move on decommissioning was now, both for positive reasons and to avoid the negative repercussions of failure to act.”
Ó hUiginn wrote that, in response, Adams said he “heard what Senator Kennedy was saying” but thought matters should be “viewed in a thirty-year time-frame”.
Paraphrasing Adams, Ó hUiginn said:
In that perspective extraordinary change had happened. He was not going to be “handcuffed to the IRA” and wanted the IRA to go into retirement.
“Timing was however crucial. Michael Collins had not achieved this goal and neither had Eamon de Valera. If he (Adams) had simply washed his hands of the IRA dimension, would the situation have been as positive as it now was?”
A few weeks after their meeting, on 7 August 2001, the IRA finally agreed on a method of destroying its weapons.
The reference number for these State Papers is 2023/53/29
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