SINCE THE EVENTS of June 30, western media has been obsessed about defining what has taken place in Egypt. Was it a coup? Was it a new revolution? Was it a ‘democratic coup’, demanded by the people? Could something like a ‘democratic coup’ actually exist?
The point, however, should not be to define the events, but to understand the reasons behind them. What drove all those masses to the streets,
Exactly this time last year, Egypt was celebrating the same newly elected, civilian president. Mohamed Morsi was sworn in four times: in front of cheering masses in Tahrir Square; at the High Constitutional Court; in front of the elite at Cairo University; and finally, at a celebration at the army head quarters. Each time he promised to be a president for all the Egyptians and asked the Egyptian people to correct him if he was ever in the wrong. Though he came from a movement that espoused political Islam, most Egyptians accepted his leadership as the first civilian, freely elected president ever.
As time passed and Morsi’s promises multiplied, Egyptians began to realise that very few of them were destined to be kept. But the erosion of Morsi’s legitimacy really began in December 2012 with a Presidential Constitutional declaration that gave him sweeping and unconditional powers as president. The new Constitution itself symbolised a broken promise.
It was written without much consultation and issued almost overnight, in contradiction to the government’s promise of broad-based consultations. Then came the appointments of “Morsi’s men”, or those who belonged to the Freedom and Justice Party, ie the Muslim Brotherhood his political party to every possible post in Egypt, from ministers and mayors, to employees in state companies.
Many Egyptians started to feel that they were being excluded from political and economic life in Egypt, and that only the interests of the president and his party were being considered. Suspicions that the president took direction from his leaders at the Muslim Brotherhood’s High Committee and that he deferred to it on important decisions were proven to be true, which again disappointed the Egyptian people, who expected him to be independent from his former allies and include tend to the needs of all the Egyptians.
Yet what he did was to exclude everyone and disregard all the demands. He insisted on following the Muslim Brotherhood social and political agenda in Egypt. The deterioration in services, security and recurring energy shortages added to the general anger, prompting Egyptians to look for ways to get out of an increasingly intractable situation. To cut a long year full of politics and suffering for Egyptians short, Egyptians discovered they were again ruled by a group that excluded most of them from the political, social and economic spheres, and instead of bettering their situation, actually made their lives more difficult.
The president lost much of his support in barely nine month’s time, and a movement that started with the idea of registering opposition the president became bigger by the day.
The Tamarod (or Rebel movement) started as a petition asking people to sign their names as a means of registering their opposition to the president, calling his legitimacy into question, and compelling an early election. The success of the movement exceeded most expectations. By the June 29, the movement had collected 22,164 million signatures.
While protests were being organised for June 30 – which marked the one-year anniversary of Morsi’s government – no one really knew what would happen. Would people go out into the street and call for early elections? What would the turnout be? Would their call be accepted?
I participated in the January 25 revolution that eventually resulted in the election of Morsi. This time it was different. This time people from every class, and every background were in the streets. This was not the middle-class, elitist revolution of January 25. That was a political movement; this time, it was a struggle for existence. The marches included everyone, and many were in the streets for the first time. Egyptians felt a collective threat to their identity, a fear that Egypt would become another Islamic state with violence, bombings in the streets, and segregation among the people.
On the June 30, people celebrated the evacuation of their country from a certain occupation, but it was still not clear what that was. The army came on to the political scene because of the threat of violence and bloodshed. Muslim Brotherhood leaders were seen in the media threatening that they would leave pools of blood in their wake.
Egyptians now have a temporary president, Counselor Adli Mahmoud Mansour, a government is being formed and a new constitutional declaration is out. Yet the Muslim Brotherhood insists on the legitimacy of their president and threatens more bloodshed. They have addressed international decision makers and especially the American administration, asking for their support in returning to power. They insist on calling what has happened a coup. But the question is this: even if they succeed in this endeavor, who will Morsi rule?
The Muslim Brotherhood insists on the legitimacy of Morsi’s power, yet millions are calling for his resignation. It claims that Morsi’s Egypt is a democratic Egypt for all, yet tries to maintain its legitimacy through religious discourse and appeals to the protection of Islam. It asks for foreign intercession of its behalf, yet calls for the protection of Islam from secularists, liberals and infidels.
The situation now is becoming increasingly ugly because of the Muslim Brotherhood’s threats and insistence on terrorising people with the potential (and actuality) of more bloodshed. The army and police are attempting to reign in the violence, but people are losing their lives in the process. And so, no one in Egypt really cares how the events of June 30 are defined. All that they care about now is that a government that includes everyone is formed, that security is restored and they can walk the streets without fear, and that Egypt regains its economic and international balance.
Nihad Fottouh is a PhD candidate at Cairo University and an assistant researcher at The Gender and Women Department at The American university in Cairo. To view more of her blog you can click here. She has also published a number of books that can be seen here and here.
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