With Angela Merkel set to clinch an historic third term as German Chancellor, her position as leader of the largest economy in Europe is secure, as expected. However, particularly in recent years, her office has expanded beyond that of a national leader with responsibilities extending far beyond the 16 German länder to a populace that will never elect or depose the occupant. German leadership in Europe is now considered standard but this represents a sea change since 1945. Germany, considering her position in the post-war world, may have the United States to thank.
SIXTY-ONE YEARS ago this month, the United States became the first non-European nation to recognise the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) comprised of France, West Germany, Luxembourg, Belgium, the Netherlands and Italy, the post-war predecessor of today’s 28 member European Union (EU) of 500 million citizens.
Those states, just years before, suffered depressed output levels (Austrian output declined to 1886 levels, French to 1891, German to 1908 and Italian to 1909). The Americans, as the only remaining great power ‘west of the Elbe (river)’ in central Germany were gifted (or bequeathed) the role as chief initiator, steward and defender of a new liberal order. The decision to suppress or cultivate the European market lay in American hands.
The original approach was a kneejerk one – suppress Germany, as US Treasury Secretary Hans Morgenthau’s punitive 1944 plan detailed. It focused on industrial disarmament in the Rhine-Ruhr region, the economic nucleus of the industrial triangle in continental Europe, forcibly turning Germany into an 18th century agrarian society. Aside from the obvious difficulties forging a rural economy from a predominately urban and developed one (eg forced migration), critics also wisely warned that Ruhr deindustrialisation had the potential to drive the Germans into Soviet arms at a time when feeding the population and the provision of law, order and security were expedient issues. But the 1944 Plan proved short-lived for two reasons.
Firstly, the ideological gulf between managed capitalism from Washington and increasingly entrenched, secretive and combative Soviet Communism from Moscow created animosity over the post-war governance of Eastern Europe, a problem which was exacerbated by the success of Communist parties in France and Italy, in particular.
In France, the PCF won between 26-29 per cent of parliamentary seats in 1945, 1946 (both elections) and maintained this as late as 1956. In Italy, the far left coalition of the Communists (PCI) and Socialists (PSI) enjoyed support ranging from 39 per cent in 1946 to 31 per cent in 1948 and 35 per cent in 1952. The overwhelming repudiation of the venerable and titanic ‘war hero’ Winston Churchill by the British electorate in 1945 in the Atlee (Labour) landslide compounded beliefs that a creeping form of ‘acceptable’ socialism existed, ideologically closer to Moscow.
Defining a contrast between the superior standard of living, open democracy and free liberalism of ‘successful’ capitalism and the inequity of ‘failing’ communist societies was suddenly vital.
Secondly, the potential for repaired Russo-German economic relations (back to WW1 levels) was a very real concern. The Soviets, technically speaking, did offer expanded markets and could supply abundant basic necessities from Eastern Europe at a lower cost than the American alternatives. With the USSR on the doorstep of Europe with an expansive, resource rich territory, it was a logical choice.
Jean Monnet, the ‘father’ of European integration and French attaché in Washington DC said at this time: “The countries of Europe are to give their peoples the prosperity that is now attainable and therefore necessary. They need wider markets.”
On both factors above, luck was on the allies’ side. The Soviets could not overcome their deep suspicion of Western intentions. A fixation with Western imperialism, the Soviets theorised that capitalist greed and militant expansionism would inevitably cause a third world war between the allies.
For now, state socialism would rest on the eastern banks of the Elbe (Churchill’s ‘Iron Curtain’ border), but would achieve rapid success in the near future as capitalist infighting for superiority would enable Soviet industry and ideology to dominate and spread, perhaps, to the Atlantic.
In the meantime, the Soviets were happy instead to consolidate their gains, propping up communist ‘satellite’ puppet states, rebuild her resources, and strengthen its Western flank through the creation of the Kominform (1947), the ‘Prague Coup’ in Czechoslovakia (1948) and the Berlin blockade (1948).
These events formally provoked an American shift to a policy of containment of Soviet ‘expansionism’ through economic and military aid provision to those states most at risk of falling into Soviet domination. And so was born the ‘Truman Doctrine’ and ultimately, the $14bn Marshall Aid Plan.
In a need to fuel the European economy, economic consolidation was vital, achieved by removing the still healthy heart (Ruhr coal and heavy industry from the West German Ruhr) and transplant that into a European ‘Frankenstein’ crafted by the allies under supranational control, ensuring an end to resource competition in the region by giving Europe a stable economic engine to power its own development. Only by doing this could Europe hope (as eventually stated in the 1957 ‘Schuman Plan’ ECSC treaty realising the Community) to succeed in “repairing their ruins, fulfilling their tremendous need for supplies, materials and tools and gradually regaining their place in the world economy”.
Of course, there are many other considerations and factors affecting early European integration. But it was undeniably the role of the Americans, in pushing for unity of the German allied ‘zones’, that sealed German economic, and eventually political ascendency, over its neighbours.
Darren Lawlor is an economist and editor of Piigsty.com, a jargon-free blog which addresses topical EU issues in an accessible, simplified and memorable way (without all the rhetoric). Contact the editor at editor@piigsty.com
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