LAST UPDATE | 9 May 2022
ON DAY 75 of the war in Ukraine, the Kremlin celebrated Victory Day in Moscow. All eyes were on Putin as it was expected he might announce a major development in his ‘special military operation’ in Donbas.
Pessimists feared that he might announce a general mobilisation of Russia’s entire military machine, calling up all reservists across the country and to declare a full scale war on Ukraine.
Other, more optimistic commentators, hoped that Putin might announce a ‘victory’ of sorts in the war, with the prospect perhaps of accelerated peace talks and a face-saving pause in military operations.
Neither has happened. The war grinds on. On Victory Day, there was no spectacular ‘win’ for Putin. The Azovstal steel plant in Mariupol remains in the hands of Ukrainian forces.
In the eastern town of Bilohorivka, a Russian air strike hit a school near the central square, reportedly killing up to sixty men, women and children sheltering there.
In Moscow, Putin, his legs covered by a blanket, gave a lacklustre speech in which he re-asserted his desire to ‘de-Nazify’ Ukraine and to rid it of ‘Banderite’ Ukrainian ultra-nationalists. However, his speech did not hint at a major escalation of the conflict.
On the ground in Luhansk and Donetsk, Russian forces continue to make minor gains, seizing the small town of Popasna. The capture of such towns however, involves their complete destruction with heavy civilian and Russian casualties. Despite an intensification of the Russian offensive in Donbas, their advance on Slovyansk and Kramatorsk has stalled.
Despite reinforcing and re-equipping their Battalion Tactical Groups (BTGs) Russian ground forces have failed to achieve any real momentum in their attempts to widen and consolidate their control of territory in the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts.
Unlike the lightning speed of their victory in Georgia in 2008, the Russian military has become bogged down in Ukraine.
Western analysts have been watching with great interest the manner in which Russian units have failed to exploit the maximum firepower of their combined arms elements.
Artillery has failed to dislodge Ukrainian defensive units and artillery in direct support to Russian armour – along with close air support – has failed to deliver kinetic, powerful offensive operations. In short, the Russian military has failed to deliver a decisive victory in Donbas within the symbolic time frame leading up to the Victory Day parade in Moscow.
Denied any significant tactical victory, and with the overall strategy in Ukraine stalled, Russia has intensified its use of ‘stand-off’ weapons – launching missile attacks at Odesa, Lviv and Kyiv. They have also increasingly targeted Ukrainian rail and distribution infrastructure in order to stem the flow of western weapon systems to the east of the country.
In a worrying development, it appears to be the case that many Russian missile and air strikes lack precision, resulting in the destruction of civilian objects – such as apartment blocks and schools – with appalling civilian casualties. There have also been reports of the illegal use of white phosphorus munitions by Russian troops in their intensified assault in Donbas.
It has been alleged that Russian forces are using white phosphorus artillery shells – which are normally used to provide illumination at night – in the ‘direct fire’ mode, converging their fire on Ukrainian defenders in dug-in positions. If true, these are desperate measures – war crimes – perpetrated by an army that is losing thousands of troops on the ground.
Given these circumstances, it is difficult to see how Russia can sustain this offensive in the long term. International sanctions have begun to bite in Russia. Its Finance Ministry has predicted a 12% reduction in GDP this year – the sharpest contraction in Russia’s economy since Boris Yeltsin’s time in office in 1994.
Whilst Putin’s approval ratings in Moscow are high – particularly among older citizens – economic austerity will erode Russian support for the Kremlin, and will erode Putin’s capacity to sustain his war effort in the medium term.
Putin’s experience as an intelligence officer appears to have failed him in the context of his invasion of Ukraine. His initial assault on Kyiv failed – and President Zelensky did not flee the country as expected. The invasion of a country the size of France, with over 40 million citizens, with a force of less than 200,000 Russian troops was a serious over-reach on Putin’s part.
The invasion has also had the effect of consolidating NATO’s cohesion and unity. The Trump administration had seriously undermined NATO’s integrity and Putin may have doubted its willingness, or ability to act collectively and resolutely in the face of his aggression in Ukraine. He was wrong. He also appears to have underestimated the resolve and unity of the EU and Britain post-Brexit.
These intelligence failures on Putin’s part have contributed to a failing and precarious military operation in Ukraine.
Indeed, NATO may expand along Russia’s borders, with Swedish and Finnish Prime Ministers Magdalena Andersson and Sanna Marin exploring the possibility of abandoning their neutral status to join the military alliance. This has the potential to further provoke Putin and those in the Kremlin who support him.
There are unique risks for escalation in this war. If Putin feels personally threatened, or if he feels cornered, he may resort to the increased use of long range weapon systems to bolster his stalled operations on the ground. Since the beginning of the conflict, Putin has threatened to use nuclear weapons in the face of ‘western’ interference in the war. He has put his nuclear forces on high alert – effectively mobilising them.
Russia has a large arsenal of nuclear weapons – approximately 6000 viable warheads. It is believed that currently, there are 1,500 of these weapons deployed and on standby – in submarines and in air-bases and launch pads throughout Russia.
Russia has developed around 2000 ‘tactical’ nuclear weapons – smaller nuclear missiles estimated to range between 1kiloton and 100 kilotons in strength. The atomic bomb dropped by the US at Hiroshima had a strength of approximately 15 kilotons – and killed almost 150,000 people in the target area.
NATO has observed that Russia has in recent years incorporated the use of small tactical nuclear weapons into their strategic doctrine in war-scenarios involving western forces. It is therefore imperative that all parties to this conflict work to de-escalate and bring the war to a halt by whatever means necessary.
Hawks will argue that appeasement will only serve to embolden Putin. They will cite his willingness to support the use of chemical weapons by Assad’s forces in Syria and his own regime’s use of nerve agents and radioactive agents against dissidents in the UK as evidence of his willingness to use a tactical nuclear weapon in Ukraine.
As Victory Day passes, all eyes will remain on Putin. The man who started this war should be called upon by the UN Secretary General to end it. The stakes for Europe and the world – in the event of escalation – are extremely high. Recent Russian TV footage of a hypothesised nuclear attack on Britain and Ireland generated alarm and unease here.
I do not believe that the Russian military will willingly resort to the use of nuclear weapons in the coming weeks and months.
I do however believe that Putin’s orientation with regard to the use of weapons of mass destruction is clear from his previous actions.
We are reaching a tipping point in the war in Ukraine. A timeline is emerging where it is becoming increasingly obvious that the Russian intervention in Ukraine is failing to deliver a quick or meaningful victory. It is also becoming increasingly obvious that the war is unsustainable in terms of the catastrophic loss of life – Ukrainian and Russian – and the economic means for Russia to remain on a war footing.
Putin’s fate as Russia’s strong man and autocratic leader is intimately linked to these developments. He may therefore be tempted to escalate the war with the reckless use of one of his tactical nuclear weapons. Whilst this risk – however slight – exists, the world’s leaders must invest in every effort to end this war.
The west’s determination to help Ukraine resist Russia must also be matched by a superhuman effort to get the Kremlin to end the war. Otherwise, we may end up in war that nobody wants. A war that will truly end all wars.
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