LAST UPDATE | 16 Aug
MONDAY MARKED 900 days since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. If a week is a long time in politics, 900 days of war is an eternity.
By virtue of Ukrainian resistance, Putin’s anticipated three-day blitzkrieg has been transformed into an open-ended and brutal war (although the Russian media is still obliged to call it a “special military operation”).
It is difficult to overstate the importance of what took place during the last week. Russia has been invaded for the first time since World War Two and Ukraine has taken approximately 1,000 square kms of territory from Moscow’s jurisdiction. A state of emergency has been declared through the Kursk and Belgorod regions, each the approximate size of Belgium. Ukraine now claims to be in control of 74 urban settlements and more than 200,000 Russians have been evacuated from the affected regions.
Kyiv’s change in tactics has caught everyone off guard, including Ukrainians, who digested news of the invasion with ill-concealed glee and relief. This is a high-risk operation and would have been months in gestation.
To have kept an operation of this scale and ambition under wraps for so long is a remarkable achievement. Even now, Ukrainian officials are tight-lipped about their intentions and objectives, but the benefits are already clear.
The move challenges the notion of Russia as an invincible power and highlights the vulnerability of its military and ruling regime. It echoes last summer’s rapid advance – 800 kilometres in a single day – by insurgent forces led by Yevgeny Prigozhin. The Kremlin has thrown everything into Ukraine, leaving Russia relatively exposed. Invading Ukrainians overwhelmed Russia’s border defences. Internal security forces might be sufficient to police Russians but are not suited for pitched battles with combat-hardened troops.
The offensive has been a shot in the arm for Ukrainian morale. In this asymmetrical war, Ukraine has regained the initiative after many months of stalemate. This can in turn create momentum and send a message that Ukraine has options and can strike at will at many locations. If nowhere is considered safe, then Russia will have to invest much more to police its long, 2000km long border with Ukraine. Ukrainians will also be satisfied to have inflicted a major psychological impact on Russian society, driving home that this is not a distant war they can ignore.
President Zelenskyy said that Kyiv wanted to “push the war on to the aggressor’s territory” and put “pressure” on Russia to “restore justice”. Zelenskyy also emphasised that the offensive aims to destroy centres from where long-range attacks on Ukraine are taking place. Ukraine has made clear it has no territorial designs on Russia. This is a defensive measure intended to ease pressure on soldiers defending Ukraine and destroy Russian military capabilities.
Tuesday marked the 24th anniversary of the sinking of the Kursk submarine, killing all 118 on board. Putin’s apparent indifference to the men’s fate during that fateful week in 2000 generated anger (after learning of the unfolding disaster, the Russian president continued vacationing in Sochi and declined foreign help to locate the submarine).
Addressing his people during his regular evening address this week, Zelenskyy said: “Twenty-four years ago, there was the disaster of Kursk – the symbolic beginning of Putin’s regime, and now we can see what is the finale for him. It is also Kursk”.
Kyiv evidently hopes that Moscow will divert resources from the entrenched theatre of war in south-eastern Ukraine. But stunning as this manoeuvre is, it will ultimately be judged less by how it begins than by how it ends. The Ukrainians retain several options, some more likely to be chosen than others. It’s unlikely for example that Ukraine will push as far forward as it can. This would put the Ukrainians at risk of being over-extended, under-resourced and encircled. Indeed, such a scenario could mirror the errors made by Russian generals when they launched their multi-directional invasion of February 2022.
To mitigate this risk, Ukraine might consolidate its forces and soon adopt a defensive strategy, using fewer troops to defend a smaller area. This approach would maintain a humiliating Ukrainian presence in Russia, altering the conflict’s optics by transforming it from a war in Ukraine to a confrontation with theatres in both countries.
During its occupation of Russian territory, Ukrainians could degrade whatever military hardware they find and capture Russian troops, who can be traded for their own POWs. They could then, should it prove optimal, withdraw from Russian territory proclaiming their tactical mission accomplished, while preserving high morale as well as their combat troops and military hardware.
Repelling the invasion quickly is crucial to avoid further humiliation for Vladimir Putin, who despite the gravity of the situation, has avoided a national address. Instead, state television has shown the Russian president addressing his subordinates, receiving updates and issuing commands. Putin has tried to downplay the invasion, describing it as a “provocation” and vowed to “kick the enemy out”.
In a chilling editorial on Wednesday entitled “No negotiations. Ukraine simply should not exist,” the state-run RIA Novosti maintained that Ukraine must be completely “cleansed”. It promised that Russia will fight until it reached the Polish border “and, if necessary, even further. In the end, the answer to the question ‘who does Russia border?’ is: ‘Russia borders whoever it wants’”.
While the Kremlin’s ambitions might be limitless, its resources are not. Russia faces challenges with personnel, and has had to resort to unconventional recruitment methods. Tens of thousands of convicted criminals have been enlisted and promised a pardon should they survive six months fighting in Ukraine. Russian army casualties are disproportionally drawn from ethnic minorities such as the Buryats and Tuvash, nations conquered by the Russian empire in centuries past, while Central Asian economic migrants are being corralled into conscription.
As the mobilisation net has widened, Russians have fled abroad, but have often stirred controversy in their hideouts. Cash-strapped Sri Lanka had proven to be a popular haven. Earlier this year, however, the government in Colombo sent 200,000 Russian migrants packing following a backlash over Russian-run businesses operating a “whites only” policy that barred locals from pubs, restaurants, and a range of other services.
Having failed to quickly subdue Ukraine, Putin is playing the long game, counting on Western fatigue, and Ukrainian exhaustion. Given its reliance on Western support, Ukraine is vulnerable to changes in the composition of allied governments. Putin has been banking on a Trump victory in the US to help change the dynamics of the war. Trump had repeatedly expressed admiration for Putin, both in terms of his personality (“strong leader”) and policy (praising Russia’s 2014 invasion as “so smart”).
The EU’s position on helping Ukrainians defend themselves has slowly evolved, but not to the level needed to match Russia’s arms industry and supplies of Iranian drones and North Korean missiles and ammunition.
Ukraine’s supporters claim they will provide “whatever it takes for as long as it takes” but this slogan rings hollow when Ukrainians are drip-fed an inadequate supply of weapons and hamstrung by restrictions imposed on their use. There is a world of difference between helping Kyiv avoid defeat and providing Ukraine with the means to win.
During the 30 months of this war, we have moved from the Kremlin planning to take Kyiv in three days to Russian evacuations from their own regions. This clearly shows that Russia is much weaker than many initially thought, and Ukraine is much stronger. From the very beginning, Ukraine has militarily had the weaker hand, but they have played that hand remarkably well.
In terms of manpower, Russia’s population is four times greater than Ukraine’s. It has more resources and hardware and a huge military-industrial complex. Ukraine has realised from the beginning that if they simply try to have a symmetric war fighting one to one against Russia, Russia would eventually win in any war of attrition. Ukrainians have adopted an innovative approach to counter their numerical disadvantages, and their resilience has repeatedly surprised everyone, allies and adversaries alike.
Donnacha Ó Beacháin is Professor of Politics at Dublin City University. For more than two decades he has worked and researched in the post-Soviet region and has been published widely on the subject.
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