ONE CORE QUESTION has loomed over the story of the Stardust fire: were the exit doors locked or unlocked?
The blaze in the north Dublin nightclub claimed the lives of 48 young people in the early hours of Valentine’s Day 1981. More than 200 were injured.
Inquests into the deaths ruled today that all had been unlawfully killed.
The fire spread out of control in a matter of minutes, catching many people off guard. The cause of the fire has never been determined.
A range of factors lead to chaotic scenes as people tried to escape, including flames spreading rapidly due to the highly flammable materials used in the furnishing of the building, the failure of the lighting system, and an almost total lack of staff training to deal with an emergency situation.
And many survivors speak of chains and padlocks on exit doors which slowed – or, for a time, prevented – their exit.
Eyewitness accounts describe crowds gathering as attempts at the exits, shouts that the doors were locked, people succumbing to fumes and collapsing as young men kicked and shouldered the doors until they burst open.
Management at the club maintained that all exit doors were unlocked at the time of the fire. At the same time, the report heard there was a practice in place for weeks before the disco whereby exits were kept locked on disco nights until as late as 12.30am.
It is not known who started this practice but it was known to and approved by the disco’s manager, Eamon Butterly, and at least three doormen, who said it was to stop people opening these doors and letting their friends in for free, bypassing the main entrance.
If the doors weren’t fully locked, chains were draped over the panic bars – the horizontal bar on emergency exits that opens the door when pushed down – to give the impression that they were locked, a practice termed ‘mock locking’.
But the extent to which doors were locked or unlocked on the night is not one with a crystal-clear answer. While many patrons speak of the struggle to open doors, the largest investigation into the fire could only be certain that one door was locked.
The tribunal took significant issue with the testimony given by some doorman on the condition of the exit doors.
“The tribunal is of the opinion that it is unsafe to arrive at any conclusion as to the locking or unlocking of the exit doors which is based solely, or even principally, on the evidence of these witnesses,” the report read, citing a lack of credibility and discrepancies in the accounts given.
Head doorman Thomas Kennan was also unable to give “any satisfactory explanation to the tribunal as to why he chose to withhold the crucial information which he alleged to have in his possession, as to the opening of the doors, until nearly a week after the fire”.
The jury in the fresh inquests which delivered a verdict today were tasked with answering a series of questions about the exits. One was if any of the exits either locked, chained, or otherwise obstructed at the time of the fire, to which they answered yes, and that it was one of the factors that contributed to the deaths of people in the nightclub.
There were six main exits:
The 1981 Keane Tribunal delved into the fire in huge detail but its conclusion that the cause of the fire was probable arson proved controversial, a findings that was later struck from the public record in 2009. This is a shadow which hangs over the mammoth report, especially after today’s verdict where the jury found the fire was caused by an electrical fault.
Here’s what the tribunal said about each exit door:
The tribunal was satisfied that this door was locked when the Stardust opened at around 10pm, and was unlocked by head doorman Thomas Kennan at around 12.20am, who left the chain and padlock hanging on the panic bar. The first person to exit by this door was able to do so without difficulty.
While the tribunal found that this door was also locked before 10pm and unlocked at 12.20am by Kennan, there was still ‘undoubted confusion’ at this exit and ‘a significant degree of obstruction’.
The evidence suggests that a chain was tied across the panic bar on both sides of the door, which would have given the impression that the door was locked and chained, the report says. Some people left to find another way out.
Eyewitnesses recalled how a group gathered at this door trying to get out, some collapsing from the fumes.
Stacks of chairs were also knocked over, causing further issues.
Once the door was open, a skip full of bottles lay immediately outside the door. It was knocked over in the rush, leading to a further delay as people tripped and fell.
A group consisting of as many as 40 people also formed at this door. Some recalled those at the front kicking the door in an attempt to open it.
Access was also impeded by a portable platform, used to extend the stage on cabaret nights.
There was “no significant degree of force was applied to the door”, the tribunal found. It accepted the evidence that the door was opened before the fire started, but it’s not clear by who, and that it was also unlocked when kegs were brought out through this exit at around 11pm.
“There is no evidence to indicate whether the door was locked or unlocked prior to that time,” the report states.
The chain and padlock were found hanging on the right hand side of the door.
The tribunal is confident that this door was locked at the time of the fire.
The report cites the damage to the door being consistent with “considerable force” having been used to open it. Eyewitness accounts recall the panic was desperate attempts were made to force it open, as it only opened partially even when it was kicked violently.
Once open, a van was parked directly in front of the exit, further impeding the escape.
The report also noted that the chain was found three days after the fire with the lock still attached to the fourth link, which bouncers said was the link used when the doors were locked, and if it had been simply draped across the bars to give the impression that the door was locked, it would have been difficult for a padlock on fourth link to become wedged behind the panic bars, preventing it from opening.
“The Tribunal is also satisfied that, while this door was unlocked when the disc jockey came in with his equipment at 20.30, it was relocked subsequently by a member of the staff who was aware of Mr Butterly’s direction that the exits should remain locked until midnight at the earliest,” the report reads.
What occurred at this exit differs from the other five. This was the main entrance rather than an emergency exit, and also the way in which the majority of people escaped, which lead to overcrowding and a crush.
The door was locked before the fire but manned by a bouncer, who opened it as people left the club. When the alarm was first raised in foyer, the bouncer opened the door and kept it open by wedging a doormat underneath one leaf.
However, as people started to pour through this doorway, the mat was dislodged and the doors closed over.
The bouncer manning this exit was unaware this had happened: he was outside trying to stop people from getting back into the blazing club. By the time it caught his attention, it was forced open from inside.
During this time, the foyer become increasingly filled with fumes, leading to some people to collapse from smoke inhalation. Other people were forced up a set of stairs where they either became trapped or broke windows to escape on to a canopy.
Two other leaves were never opened.
The corridor here did not meet the correct building standards and became smoke-logged at an early stage of the night, but the exit doors themselves appeared to open without issue.
The Tribunal contends that a doorman likely opened these at an early point in the evening while opening exits five and six, but it’s not clear. It outlines that it was more likely he unlocked this door at this point, rather than after the fire started.
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